In 'Fixing our Broken Housing Market', the main housing white paper published in February 2017, the UK Government specifically identified small and medium sized property businesses as having a key role in solving the housing crisis. Proposals focused on unlocking sites, planning constraints, construction barriers and funding for this segment. They committed to 'make more land available for homes in the right places by maximising the contribution from brownfield and surplus public land, regenerating estates, releasing more small and medium sized sites, allowing rural communities to grow and making it easier to build new settlements'.
|detailed statistics by year|
|Average Size of Loan||£326,857||£335,500||£550,375||£475,544||£357,441||£407,451||£458,682||£536,890||£438,257|
|Number of Loans||7||12||8||32||81||126||155||70||494|
|Average Project Size||£381,667||£518,200||£629,571||£793,790||£733,500||£689,945||£929,235||£1,573,047||£848,982|
|Total GDV Funded||£4,486,000||£11,713,500||£8,852,000||£45,478,000||£64,711,590||£82,942,520||£170,644,075||£87,046,415||£481,349,100|
|Total Units Funded||30||71||69||287||359||420||748||315||2,299|
|Average Loan Term (months)||10||13||16||15||13||12||13||14||13|
|Loan to current market value1||60.0%||64.2%||69.3%||59.6%||60.8%||55.6%||61.3%||61.7%||60.2%|
|Loan to GDV Excluding Interest2||55.1%||47.4%||53.2%||52.0%||55.9%||54.0%||59.6%||58.1%||56.0%|
|Loan to GDV Including Interest3||60.2%||52.3%||60.1%||59.4%||60.8%||56.7%||61.9%||60.9%||59.8%|
|Defaulted Projects (>180 Days)4||0||2||0||3||8||6||0||0||19|
|Defaulted Projects (>180 Days) Repaid||0||2||0||2||6||2||0||0||12|
|Actual Capital Losses||£0||£0||£0||£0||£0||£0||£0||£0||£0|
|Actual Investor Interest Losses||£0||£0||£0||£0||£0||£0||£0||£0||£0|
|Total Capital Paid Back||£2,287,500||£4,026,000||£4,403,000||£14,855,530||£26,820,513||£44,067,743||£24,148,134||£240,000||£120,848,420|
|Total Investor Interest Paid Back||£243,719||£404,763||£449,589||£1,790,333||£2,635,678||£3,175,829||£1,628,107||£65,041||£10,393,059|
|Total Paid Back||£2,531,219||£4,430,763||£4,852,589||£16,645,863||£29,456,191||£47,243,572||£25,776,241||£305,041||£131,241,479|
|Borrower Contract Rate7||11.71%||10.00%||10.00%||10.00%||9.85%||9.98%||9.84%||9.76%||9.91%|
|Borrower Actual Rate8||15.67%||10.17%||10.25%||10.55%||10.22%||10.22%||10.00%||9.00%||10.37%|
|Investor Contract Rate7||9.71%||8.00%||8.00%||8.00%||7.86%||7.93%||7.64%||7.42%||7.78%|
|Investor Actual Rate8||13.04%||8.17%||8.07%||8.19%||8.04%||8.04%||7.72%||6.80%||8.14%|
All reporting is based on the year of origination.
For all averages, subsequent raises are not included in the averages to ensure no double counting.
RICS – Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors
This material contains statistics that have been prepared by CrowdProperty. The underlying data is based on past projects, however this information should not be construed as legal, tax, investment, financial, or accounting advice.
Any future forecasts that are shown combine our knowledge, with a number of risks, uncertainties and assumptions about any future states, many of these are beyond the control of CrowdProperty.
Nothing contained within the information provided is or should be relied upon as a warranty, promise, or representation, express or implied, as to the future performance of any loan through CrowdProperty. Any historical information contained in this statistical information is not indicative of future performance.
Scrutiny and verification of our loan book over the full history of the platform by LoanClear (formerly Brismo) independently verifies our 100% track record and the significantly higher returns delivered by CrowdProperty versus the overall UK marketplace lending returns index.
LoanClear’s methodology is explained in detail on their website - in summary: every loan is analysed, tracking loan cashflows against initial capital, expected interest and the loan term originally contracted. Loans which are later than the FCA proposed and 36H Group definition of technical default (180 days for property development), or otherwise marked as defaulted for any other reason by CrowdProperty, have industry standard capital write down assumptions applied to them, thereby suppressing return accruals. The early-to-mid 2017 dip in the CrowdProperty returns line shows this effect from the 3 loans extended by more than 180 days (from our 2015 and 2016 loan cohorts). The recovery in the CrowdProperty returns line is then caused by 100% recovery of the capital and interest for these late-running loans.
As full supporters of the FCA’s call for improved and consistent disclosure in the marketplace lending sector, in addition to ongoing best-in-class disclosure on this page, CrowdProperty provides LoanClear with monthly updates on each loan at a cashflow level.
As part of our dedication to maintaining 0% capital losses through more than 5 years of lending and our unparalleled standard of due diligence, CrowdProperty has undertaken a thorough, multi-scenario loan book resilience study on all active loans to understand the loan book’s exposure to economic volatility. CrowdProperty analysed the causes of the 2007/08 and 1989/90 crises and from the aggregation of localised house price data during the 2007/08 and 1989/90 crises, derived resilience resource scenarios. The scenarios, analysed and applied at localised levels given differing impacts, have been examined to resource the resilience of the existing loan book to determine what economic conditions would compromise the security underpinning CrowdProperty loans, potentially compromising the 0% capital losses of the platform to date. From this resilience resourcing, validation of our entry criteria for loans is detailed in this report and the resultant data analytics built into future loan appraisal assessment.
Resilience testing is not investment advice. Our resilience testing is an evaluation of our current loan book, based upon previous economic crises which impacted the residential property (housing) market. The main purpose of our testing is to evaluate our current loan criteria and processes, as well as to assess the potential impact of another housing market downturn. Although our resilience testing shows our loan book should be secure in the event of another economic crisis, past performance is not a guide to future returns and, when lending towards any investment product, your capital is at risk.